This essay provides an introduction to the terminology, concepts, methods, and challenges of image‐based modeling in biology. Image‐based modeling and simulation aims at using systematic, quantitative image data to build predictive models of biological systems that can be simulated with a computer. This allows one to disentangle molecular mechanisms from effects of shape and geometry. Questions like “what is the functional role of shape” or “how are biological shapes generated and regulated” can be addressed in the framework of image‐based systems (...) biology. The combination of image quantification, model building, and computer simulation is illustrated here using the example of diffusion in the endoplasmic reticulum. (shrink)

We investigate the join semilattice of modal operators on a Boolean algebra B. Furthermore, we consider pairs ⟨f,g⟩\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\langle f,g \rangle $$\end{document} of modal operators whose supremum is the unary discriminator on B, and study the associated bi-modal algebras.

What is the ontological status of a musical work? This paper enters the discussion of the question between Julian Dodd and Michael Morris. Dodd is a proponent of a type-token view, which is a version of Platonism. Morris has formulated an argument that purports to show that a musical work cannot be a token of a type. If successful, the argument presents a serious challenge for a type-token theorist with implications for Platonism as a whole. Morris’s argument is, however, problematic (...) in several respects. The aim of this paper is to identify the problems and weaken the strength of Morris’s argument, thus restoring the original appeal of a type-token view. (shrink)

In this paper we revisit Pavel Tichý’s novel distinction between one-dimensional and two-dimensional conception of inference, which he presented in his book Foundations of Frege’s Logic (1988), and later in On Inference (1999), which was prepared from his manuscript by his co-author Jindra Tichý. We shall focus our inquiry not only on the motivation behind the introduction of this non-classical concept of inference, but also on further inspection of selected Tichý’s arguments, which we see as the most compelling or simply (...) most effective in providing support for his two-dimensional account of inference. Main attention will be given to exposing the failure of one-dimensional theory of inference in its explanation of indirect (reductio ad absurdum) proofs. Lastly, we discuss shortly the link between two-dimensional inference and deduction apparatus of Tichý’s Transparent Intensional Logic. (shrink)

Strohal, R. Parmenides und das "Sein".--Erismann, T. Erkenntnis und Sein.--Jacoby, G. Die ontologischen Grundlagen des psychophysischen Problems.--Kohler, I. Grenzen der Psychologie.--Mayer-Hillebrand, F. Über Bedeutung und Berechtigung der Normwissenschaften.--Meister, R. Handlungen, Taten, Werke als psychische Objektivationen.--Oberhammer, G. Metaphysik und Mystik bei Plotin.--Pechhacker, A. Vérités de fait, vérités éternelles.--Scheffler, P. Wohlklang und physikalische Gesetzmässigkeiten.--Schlismann, A. Wort und Wirklichkeit.--Windischer, H. Das Transzendieren als Problem der neueren Ontologie.--Wohlgenannt, R. Politische Wirklichkeit und philosophische Erkenntnis.

Let R be an associative ring with identity. It is shown that every Σ-cotorsion left R-module satisfies the descending chain condition on divisibility formulae. If R is countable, the descending chain condition on M implies that it must be Σ-cotorsion. It follows that, for countable R, the class of Σ-cotorsion modules is closed under elementary equivalence and pure submodules. The modules M that satisfy this descending chain condition are the cotorsion analogues of totally transcendental modules; we characterize them as the (...) modules M for which , for every countably presented flat module F. (shrink)

The central concern of this erudite and lavish work is "to trace that part of the Lullian movement which was centered on Paris." The first part of the book sketches the life and character of Ramon Lull and his relationship to the politics of his age. Lull emerges as a fascinating person and thinker, whose life was intertwined in the thought and politics of the generation following the condemnation of 1277. Lull was a crusading yet irenic missionary to the Arabs. (...) At the same time he was a thinker whose thought was rooted in the traditional currents of Christian thought stemming from Anselm and Neo-Platonism, and quite opposed to Averroism. Yet he was also an impressively original theologian with great confidence in the demonstrative power of theological thought. The second part of Hillgarth’s study begins by showing that Paris was the most influential center for the diffusion of Lull’s thought in the fourteenth century. At Paris Thomas Le Myésier proves to have been a particularly influential Lullist. After chapters devoted to Le Myésier’s patrons and his manuscript collections, the central chapter of the book is devoted to a detailed discussion of Le Myésier’s compilations of Lull’s thought. In an epilogue, the subsequent fortunes of Lullism are traced in such figures as Heimeric van de Velde, Nicholas of Cusa, Ramon Sibiuda, Pier Leoni, Lefèvre d'Etaples and Ivo Salzinger. Considerable attention is given to Lullian manuscripts, both in the above mentioned chapters and in the appendices, which also include the Latin texts of some of Le Myésier’s works. This book, because of its price and its scholarly intent, will be of interest primarily to students with a special interest in Lull. However, the first part on Lull, the chapter on Le Myésier’s compilations, and the epilogue will also be helpful to anyone who wishes to bring himself abreast of recent scholarly study of Lull and his influence.—H. F. (shrink)

E n e l a r tícul o s e aborda n lo s pro b lema s d e l e gitimació n qu e plantea n la s nu ev a s fo r mas d e r e gulació n qu e s e asocia n co n l a “gobe r nanza ” com o model o d e ejercici o de l poder distint o a l “gobie r no” . Ant e l a crisi (...) s d e lo s criterio s tradicionale s d e l e gitimida d anclados e n e l model o representat ivo d e la s democracia s d e lo s Estado-nación , l a gobe r nanz a se reclam a com o un a fo r m a d e gobie r n o n o sol o má s e f ica z e n té r mino s d e gobe r nabilida d de l a complejida d d e l a socieda d globalizad a d e nuestro s días , sin o tambié n má s democrática po r e l pape l qu e atribu ye a l a deliberació n y a l a pa r ticipació n d e actore s pr iv ado s y pa r tes interesada s e n e l proces o d e tom a d e decisiones . E n pa r ticula r , s e analiza n la s apo r taciones pr o v eniente s d e Estado s Unido s de l llamad o “ e xperimentalism o democrático ” o “polia r quía deliberat iva directa ” y s u pa r ticula r influenci a e n e l ámbit o d e l a Unió n Europea , e n cu yo sen o la s nu ev a s fo r ma s d e gobe r nanz a y d e e xperimentalism o democrátic o —cas o del “métod o abie r t o d e coordinación” — s e ha n presentad o com o l a estrat e gi a má s adecuada par a afronta r e l pro b lem a crónic o de l dé f ici t democrátic o d e l a polític a y de l derech o co- munitario . A pesa r d e la s sugerente s promesa s democráticas , e l auto r present a la s paradojas y riesgo s e n té r mino s d e l e gitimida d democrátic a d e esta s nu ev a s fo r ma s d e r e gulació n y conclu ye qu e s u llamad a a l a pa r ticipació n d e l a socieda d e n l a tom a d e decisione s puede se r considerad a má s u n mit o qu e un a realidad. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:New Light from Arabic Sources on Galen and the Fourth Figure of the Syllogism NICHOLAS RESCHER The Problem of the Origin of the Fourth Figure FLYING IN THE FACE of the long-standing tradition--going back in Europe to Renaissance times--which credits Galen of Pergamon with the origination of the fourth syllogistic figure, recent authorities have almost to a man evinced doubt about Galen's claim to this innovation. Heinrieh Scholz speaks (...) of "the Galenian syllogistic figure which has been attributed to him, probably wrongly." i j. W. Stakelum concludes his careful discussion of the matter with the categorical assertion that "Galen did not teach the fourth figure." ~ I. M. Bochenski--following Lukasiewicz (see below)--says that the fourth figure "was only ascribed to Galen by a misunderstanding." : William Kneale (also following Lukasiewicz) writes that "it is easy to see how misunderstanding.., by some Arabian philosopher... could have given rise to the tradition that Galen added a fourth figure to Aristotle's syllogistic theory." 4 The currently received account of the matter is that of Jan Lukasiewicz who, in his book on Aristotle's Syllogistic (1951; 2d ed., 1957), presents the known reports about Galen and the fourth figure as follows (I list them in the order in which they came to light) : 1) Several passages in Averroes' (d. 1198) Middle Commentary on Prior Analytics credit Galen with introducing a fourth figure (ad Anal. Pr. I, 5; I, 8; I, 23). These passages, known in Europe through a Renaissance Latin translation of a Hebrew version, provided the basis upon which Zabarella in his work, De Quarta Syllogismorum Figura (in his Opera [Leiden: 1587], pp. 41-53), popularized the "Galenian figure" in European logic. 2) In 1844 Minoides Mynas published in the Preface to his edition of Galen's EisagSg~ dialektik~ an anonymous Greek fragment (late, perhaps 6th century) which states that certain "later scholars" transformed the indirect moods of the first figure added by Theophrastus and Eudeffms into a new fourth figure, citing Galen as the originator of this doctrine.~ 1Abriss der Geschichte der Logik (Miinster: 1931), trans, into English by K. F. Leidecker, ConciseHistory of Logic (NewYork: 1961);p. 38ofthe Englishversion. "Why 'Galenian' Figure?" The New Scholasticism, XVI (1942),289-296. s Formale Logik (Miinchen-Freiburg:1956; 2nd. ed., 1962), trans, into English by Ivo Thomas, A History of Formal Logic (Notre Dame: 1961);p. 142of the Englishversion. Williamand Martha Kneale, The Developmentof Logic (Oxford: 1962),p. 184. Alsoprinted in Karl Kalbfieisch, ~ber Galen s Einleitung in die Logik, 2~. Supplementband der Jahrbi~cherfi~r klassische Philologie (Leipzig:1897), p. 707. This datum casts some 28 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 3) A Greek fragment was found around 1858 by Karl Prantl in a logical work of the Byzantine scholar Ioannes Italus (llth century) which says that Galen taught the existence of a fourth figure, adding sarcastically that he (Galen) thought thus to appear cleverer than the older logical commentators (presumably Theophrastus and Eudemus are intended), but fell far short.6 4) In 1899 Maximilian Wallies published7 an anonymous Greek scholium (of perhaps the 6th or the 7th century) on Ammonins' commentary on Prior Analytics which states that Galen "says in his Apodictic that there are four figures, because he looks at the compound syllogisms consisting of four terms (i.e., with three premisses )" rather than the simple (three-term, two-premiss) syllogisms of Aristotle. (The scholiast goes on to explain at some length how such compound syllogisms can be sorted into four groups.) It is readily seen that, given these data, two possibilities stand before us: a) Galen did actually invent the traditional fourth figure. Reports (1)-(3) are correct, and the anonymous scholiast of (4) was put on the wrong track by the fact that Galen also said that compound syllogisms of four terms can be classed into four groups. b) Galen did not invent the traditional fourth figure. Only after his time when once the indirect moods of the first figure had--somehow--become systematized into a separate "figure," was this credited to Galen by a mistake along the lines described by the anonymous scholiast. Thus (4) alone is right, and (1)-(3) are mistaken. Which of... (shrink)

E n est e ens a yo l a autor a present a u n model o alte r nat ivo a l imaginari o polític o w es t f alian o qu e reconoc e l a “justici a ano r mal ” com o e l horizont e dentr o de l cua l tiene n que pros e gui r actualment e toda s la s batalla s contr a l a injusticia . S e trat (...) a d e un a propuesta const r uct iv a par a afronta r lo s conflicto s acerc a de l “quién ” d e l a justici a e n la s condiciones actuale s d e justici a ano r mal . P o r u n lado , e l concept o d e des-enma r qu e l e pe r mit e realizar l a impugnació n de l marc o w est f alian o d e l a justici a y , a l contempla r l a posibilida d d e que dete r minada s cuestione s d e justici a d e prime r orde n h a ya n sid o enmarcada s injustamente, abr e u n espaci o par a concepcione s n o h e gemónica s de l “quién” . P o r otr o lado , e l principio d e todos-los-sometido s ofrec e un a ví a par a v alora r l a justici a d e lo s “quiénes ” r iv ale s y pe r mit e sopesa r su s mérito s relat iv os. (shrink)

First published in 1931 and originally delivered as the Deems Lectures at New York University in 1929, this book examines what scientific discoveries in many different branches of science reveal, and the implications of such discoveries for philosophy. Esteemed philosopher F. S. C. Northrop surveys a variety of advances, including relativity and quantum mechanics, and how they correlate to his epistemological theory of concepts. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in the history of science and (...) the connection between science and philosophy. (shrink)

If the contemporary rebirth of the ontological argument had its conception in Norman Malcolm's discovery of a second Anselmian argument it had its full-term delivery as a healthy philosophical progeny with Alvin Plantinga's sophisticated modal version presented in the tenth chapter of The Nature of Necessity. This latter argument has been the centre of a huge body of literature over the last fifteen years, and deservedly so. One is impressed that this version of Anselm's jewel is valid and sound if (...) any is. (shrink)

Brain-centered theories of consciousness seem to face insuperable difficulties. While some philosophers now doubt that the hard problem of consciousness will ever be solved, others call for radically new approaches to conscious experience. In this article I resurrect a largely forgotten approach to consciousness known as neorealism. According to neorealism, consciousness is merely a part, or cross-section, of the environment. Neorealism implies that all conscious experiences, veridical or otherwise, exist outside of the brain and are wholly independent of being perceived (...) or not; nonveridical perceptions of the environment over an arbitrarily short period of time are supposed to be objective constituents of the environment over a more extended time scale. I argue here that neorealism fares at least as well as brain-centered theories of consciousness on a number of fundamental issues. On one fundamental issue—the nature of the relation between veridical and nonveridical perceptions—neorealism outperforms its competitors. (shrink)

BackgroundNusinersen is one of an increasing number of new, expensive orphan drugs to receive authorization. These drugs strain public healthcare budgets and challenge principles for resource allocation. Nusinersen was introduced in the Norwegian public healthcare system in 2018. A national expert group consisting of physicians was formed to oversee the introduction and continuation of treatment in light of specific start and stop criteria.MethodsWe have studied experiences within the expert group with a special emphasis on their application of the start and (...) stop criteria, rationing of treatment, and experienced moral dilemmas. A research interview with six members of the national expert group was performed, then analysed with manifest content analysis. The analysis was supplemented with publically available sources on priority setting and the process leading up to the introduction of nusinersen and the establishment of the expert group.ResultsSixty-six patients have received treatment within the first 25 months since the national expert group’s establishment. Treatment has not been discontinued for any patient. No patients under 18 years of age have been denied treatment, as those who were referred at this age were all deemed to fulfill the start criteria. The expert group has, however, increased geographical treatment equity and facilitated important cooperation at the national level. Furthermore, it has enhanced open and critical discussions of both medical issues and new ethical dilemmas.ConclusionAlthough facilitating equal access to treatment for SMA patients, the national expert group has not discontinued treatment for any patient. It is suggested that in order for clinicians to be able to ration care for individual patients, they require both adequate support and sufficient formal authority. Start and stop criteria need to be re-evaluated as more knowledge and experience are gained regarding the treatment. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE INCOMMUNICABILITY OF HUMAN PERSONS JOHN F. CROSBY, III Franciscan University of Steubenville Steubenville, Ohio I PROPOSE TO explore the idea that persons do not exist as replaceable specimens of or as mere instances of an ideal or type, but rather exist in some sense for their own sakes, each existing as incommunicably his or her own.1 I undertake this study in the conviction that the incommunicability of persons (...) is profoundly characteristic for them precisely as persons, and has a major role to play in any philosophy of the person. And there is an entirely different reason which attracts me to this subject. I think that most of what I have to say here can find acceptance across a broad spectrum of philosophical positions. At a time when thinkers are increasingly suspicious of universally valid truth about man, when many of them think that a vision of man is proper only to some tradition and valid only within that tradition and not beyond it, one can offer a salutary challenge to one's contemporaries by showing a centrally important truth about persons which, as I say, can be accepted by philosophers coming from the most various points of view. Suppose that you were to minimalize the death of someone by saying that at least the human species did not die with him or her, as if the immortality of the species more than compensated for the mortality of this individual : everyone understands that you would thereby radically depersonalize the deceased. Or suppose that you were grieving over the death of someone dear to you, and a friend tried to comfort you with the thought that the 1 My thanks to Josef Seifert, William Frank, Damian Fedoryka, and Katryna Fedoryka for their comments on earlier drafts of this study. The text of this article forms Chapter Two of my book, Essay on Personal Selfhood, which is close to completion. 403 404 JOHN F. CROSBY, III particular excellences of the deceased, which awakened your love, also exist in other human beings who are still living, as if you could continue to love in them what you had loved in the deceased. Again, everyone understands that if you treat people having excellences as if they were replaceable specimens of those excellences, then you lose your grip on them as persons. But why is this? Why is personhood driven out of human beings as soon as their species-membership, or their particular excellences, are thought to predominate in them? What is that incommunicability of each person which is obscured as soon as persons are thought to be only specimens? One commonly thinks that this aspect of personal selfhood has been recognized only in modern thought; in fact it was recognized already by St. Thomas Aquinas. Creatura autem rationalis divinae providentiae substat sicut secundum se gubernata et provisa, non solum propter speciem, ut aliae corruptibiles creaturae : quia individuum quod gubernatur solum propter speciem, non gubernatur propter seipsum; creatura autem rationalis propter seipsam gubernatur, ut ex dictis manifestum est. Sic igitur solae rationales creaturae directionem a Deo ad suos actus accipiunt non solum propter speciem, sed secundum individuum.2 Notice that Aquinas teaches here the metaphysical ultimacy of personal incommunicability; it exists even before God in the sense 2 " Now, a rational creature exists under divine providence as a being governed and provided for in himself, and not simply for the sake of his species, as is the case with other corruptible creatures. For the individual that is governed only for the sake of the species is not governed for its own sake, but the rational creature is governed for his own sake, as is clear from what we have said (ch. 112). And so, only rational creatures receive direction from God in their acts, not only for the species, but for the individual." Summa Contra Gentiles, III, ch. 113 (Bourke translation). By the way, Chapters 111-114 of Book III seem to me to constitute the most " personalist " passage' in the entire corpus of St. Thomas. The modern reader sees to his amazement that St. Thomas here has already made his own the Kantian idea that each person in a sense exists for his... (shrink)

As a statistician, whose job is to advise on how to make inductions from observations with the aid of the theory of probability, I hope I shall be pardoned some comments on Mr. Kneale's discussion of this subject.

In this article, F. Tony Carusi considers the politics of instrumentalism performed between educational policy and research that figures the teacher as the primary means to raise student achievement. By reducing teachers to a means toward an end, policy and research work together to collapse what teachers are into what teachers are for, and in doing so, they enable discourses that privilege the instrumental specifically as ontological. In contrast to this collapse, Carusi highlights here the resistance of the ontological to (...) the instrumental by considering what teachers are apart from what they are for. Thinking the ontological apart from the instrumental leads to a dark pedagogy in which the refusals and negations performed by teachers occur where the politics of instrumentalism that renders them as an “in-school factor” do not see. (shrink)